I present game theory models for parental care by male and female parents of male and female offspring. The models include the effects of Fisherian frequency dependence (FFD), the trade-off between offspring fitness and the residual fitness of the parent, and the conflict between the two parents. The models are used to make predictions about the factors selecting for biases in parental care with respect to either offspring or parental sex. The models predict that: (1) male and female offspring will receive different amounts of care when the offspring functions (relating fitness accrued through an offspring to the amount of care that it receives, excluding the effects of FFD) differ between the male and female offspring; (2) male and female parents will give different amounts of care when either (a) the parental functions (relating the loss in residual fitness to the total amount of care given by the parent, excluding the effects of FFD) differ between male and female parents, or (b) offspring functions differ between male and female offspring and FFD also acts on residual fitness of parents; and (3) there will be an interaction between offspring and parental sex on the amount of care received (a) by an offspring within a family when the offspring functions are not the same for male and female parents (but then the sex bias is extreme and one parent does not care for one sex of offspring), and (b) by the family in relation to its sex ratio when offspring functions differ between male and female offspring (but not necessarily between male and female parents) and parental functions differ between male and female parents.
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The simplest models of parental investment consider a single parent investing in identical offspring. Complexity is generated when more than one parent invests in nonidentical offspring. The gender of both parents and offspring are capable of generating differences in the costs and benefits of investment for the two parents in relation to the particular offspring that they nurture. Such sexual asymmetries may select for three types of sex bias in parental investment. First, parental investment may depend on the sex of the parent but not of the offspring: such differences in the care provided by the two parents are common throughout the animal kingdom, and beyond. Second, parental investment may depend on the sex of the offspring but not of the parent: such investment appears to be due to differences in the 'neediness' (the amount of care needed to achieve a given fitness) of male and female offspring, perhaps due to sexual size dimorphism or differential juvenile dispersal affecting the usefulness of body reserves at the time of independence (Stamps 1990) . Third, there may be an interaction between parental and offspring sex, such that the proportion of care received from each of the parents depends on the sex of the offspring (Gowaty & Droge 1991). Examples of this type of bias are known from several bird species (Stamps et al. 1987; Gowaty & Droge 1991; Clotfelter 1996; Nishiumi et al. 1996) . Gowaty & Droge (1991) have suggested that this will occur when the net fitness value of a given sex of offspring differs between the two parents, perhaps as a result of helping or competitive behaviour by one sex of offspring that is experienced more intensely by one of the sexes of parent.
Any model that considers sex biases in parental investment in relation to both offspring and parental sex is necessarily complex. First, the optimal division of a fixed quantity of resources between existing male and female offspring depends on the overall relationship between offspring fitness and care received, and must take into account Fisherian frequency dependence in which the expected reproductive success of the offspring depends on the population sex ratio (Fisher 1958; Maynard Smith 1980) . Second, the total investment by a parent is determined by a trade-off (the 'cost of reproduction') between fitness gained through current offspring, and the reduction in future survival and fecundity as a consequence of present investment (Williams 1966) . Third, when two parents provide care, the fitness consequences of a given
